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1 Introduction
[In dynamic markets], the inefficiencies caused by asymmetric informa-
tion manifest in the fact that sellers of higher qualities need to wait
longer than sellers of lower quality in order to sell. The cost of waiting
is an important factor that must be considered in any assessment of the
loss in welfare caused by adverse selection.
[Nevertheless], observed market dynamics may differ considerably from
our predictions. This is because in the real world, the price mechanism
is augmented by other non-market institutions and technologies that
enable agents to signal or screen information and they alter the behavior
of agents as well as the pattern of trade.
Janssen and Roy (2004, pp. 567-568)
We investigate welfare and equilibrium trading in a decentralized search market
with asymmetric information and additional bilateral communication opportunities.
Buyers and sellers match in pairs and view a shared signal of the seller’s quality.
We show that in the lemons market low quality is always more liquid in a stationary
Markovian equilibrium but in a better market, where the entering average quality
is so high that the static Walrasian market need not fail, the opposite case is also
possible.
Models or adverse selection are applied to study problems that arise when dif-
ferent qualities are traded in a single market. The basic idea is that all goods are
blended together so that buyers cannot be sure of what quality they obtain from a
random seller. This implies that, in a static model without any information perco-
lation from the selling side to the buying side, the market can fail to trade highest
quality goods as the maximum price a buyer is willing to pay for average quality
could be below the highest quality seller’s reservation value (Akerlof, 1970). In a
dynamic setting, the general finding is that this ”lemons problem” is slightly less
stringent because, if the sellers can wait and delay trade, it becomes possible to
sort different qualities temporarily into different submarkets; yet, this means that
low quality should be traded at a faster rate than high quality (see, e.g., Moreno
and Wooders (2010, 2016); Inderst and Muller (2002); Inderst (2002); Janssen and
Roy (2002, 2004); Blouin (2003); Guerrieri et al. (2010), Kim (2012), Camargo and
1
Lester (2014), and Cho and Matsui (2015)).1
The utilized sorting mechanism is essentially the following: sellers of low quality
goods can be induced to trade for lower prices than sellers of high quality goods
if the chance to trade for higher prices arrives too far ahead in the future or so
infrequently that it does not pay for the low quality sellers to wait that long; high
quality sellers are instead willing to do so because they have no other possibility to
trade profitably.
While these standard trading dynamics are now a robust result in the literature,
in this paper we show that the usual way of formulating the dynamic lemons prob-
lem has limitations, which can however be overcome with a slightly more general
interpretation. With this less restricted approach, we find that different equally
natural inverse trading dynamics can arise, where highest quality is systematically
traded fastest. Our discovery therefore helps to reconcile the lemons model better
with the commonly held idea that, if there is any chance of guessing the quality,
better goods are bought first. As some additional information is typically exchanged
before signing the contract, we do not see for example the best new doctors idling
in the market for extended periods of time until some institution is finally willing
to accept their salary proposal. Indeed, in these kinds of markets, the costs of a
long time delay or hiring the wrong person could be so high that both sides have
an incentive to make the most of whatever information they have at the moment of
trading, reliable or only remotely relevant.2
Motivated by these ideas, our paper thus asks a specific question: Is low quality
always traded faster than high quality – in a stationary Markovian equilibrium of a
large anonymous market, where buyers and sellers use only pure strategies, so that
nothing very complicated is going on? We find that the answer is yes and no. We
use a model which allows us to consider not only the ”lemons market” where the
exogenous entrant quality is low but also a ”better market” where the exogenous
entrant quality is high.
To provide an answer to the conundrum, we are now able to show definitively
1We do not attempt to review this extensive literature here but these papers serve as excellent
pointers to others. A fuller literature review is offered for example by the important recent paper
of Moreno and Wooders (2016), which studies non-stationary trading dynamics and potential for
performance improving intervention in a decentralized lemons market, and by the uncompromising
and admirably rigorous contribution of Cho and Matsui (2015), which only looks at the lemons
market but shares our aim of concentrating on simple, stationary equilibria in a decentralized
dynamic trading model.
2Though not central to performance in many jobs, things like looks, dress, acting confident etc.
might still pay some role in evaluations (see Hamermesh et al. (2002) and Mobius and Rosenblat
(2006)) in addition to the hard information in the vita.
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that it is impossible to have inverse dynamics in the lemons market but not it the
better market. Notice that both of these cases are relevant as examples of markets
where adverse selection is a problem because, as it turns out, the market is always
inefficient in both.
We look for the (im)possibility of maintaining inverse dynamics in quite a large
set of candidate equilibria. To give us maximum leeway, we let a matched buyer
and seller first obtain a shared signal that is informative of the seller’s quality and
then, after both have seen this, we allow the seller make the buyer a take-it-or-leave
it price offer. This will turn our game into a signaling game where the level of
the shared signal may affect whether different sellers make a pooling price offer or
separating price offers.
To cast this back into the language of job market search, our formulation at-
tempts to capture the idea that, when an applicant and the agents of a hiring
institution meet face-to-face to negotiate a contract, some telltale, quality relevant
information is quite often transmitted under both parties’ eyes. The purpose of a
job talk, an interview or an internship is to give the hiring agents a first impression
of the applicant. Interestingly, in all these cases, also the applicant typically knows
if it is (not) good.3
This shared signal gives the matched pair a piece of correlated information, that
could take their prospects of reaching an agreement either up or down. As an
intermediate contribution we first characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria
in the trading game between a buyer and a seller given some fixed shared signal,
fixed continuation values for the buyer and sellers of different qualities, and fixed
average quality in the market.4 To see what kind of trading patterns are sustainable
in the long run, we later endogenize these outside options and the average market
quality. In doing so, we assume in the same vein as in seminal article by Moreno and
Wooders (2010) that (i) entry flows to the market are exogenous, (ii) buyers and
sellers in the market are matched randomly with a new potential trading partner
each time period, and (iii) they exit the market when they have traded.
We find that the availability of the signal always raises either the buyer’s or the
high quality seller’s continuation values over zero. This implies that, when the signal
is very low, either the buyer or a high quality seller will refuse to trade with their
current trading partner and will instead wait until they get a chance to trade under
3In our model, the buyer observes a signal sb of the seller’s quality and the seller observes a
signal si of the buyer’s signal; for simplicity, we assume they are the same, i.e., sb = si =: s.
4To make sure we cover all the equilibria, we consider maximal punishments off the equilibrium
path. All the equilibria are consistent with the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
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a higher signal. As a result, all equilibria are characterized by a cutoff signal s′ such
that, if the signal is higher than the cutoff, the sellers can rely on this costless signal
to support a pooling price offer whereas, if the signal is lower than the cutoff, the
sellers must resort to costly signaling, which here means that, if the low quality seller
offers a low (revealing) price, it is accepted but, if the high quality seller offers a
high (revealing) price, is rejected.5 Some mutually beneficial trading opportunities
can thus not be commensurated: there is waste for the lowest signals.
Basically, the cases of standard dynamics and inverse dynamics in our model
now simply differ in what happens when the signal is lower than the cutoff. Namely,
in a better market, the rents that come from trading for the same higher prices as
high quality sellers can make low quality sellers so picky that they no longer have an
incentive to trade for their low revealing price if the signal is low. High quality then
trades faster than low quality because it is more likely to prompt favorable signals
that are higher than the cutoff.
In the lemons market, however, it is impossible to sustain this because the price
that the buyer is willing to pay at the cutoff signal is necessarily lower than the
buyer value of entry level average quality; high quality sellers are not willing to
trade for so low prices. There is hence an inconsistency embedded in this idea in the
lemons market. That derives from the standard monotone likelihood ratio property
and from the fact that inverse dynamics here entail that average market quality is
below average quality at entry.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few earlier papers which find
inverse trading dynamics. First, in the paper that has now a classic status in the
literature, Taylor (1999) studies a housing market where the buyer with the highest
bid for the house can inspect the property before buying. If the house is in good
condition, nothing negative is found and the buyer thus proceeds to purchase the
property but, if the house is in bad condition, some buyers find it out and might
hence refuse to buy it. As a result, better houses are more liquid than houses that
have some problems, which might surface in a sufficiently careful examination. Long
time on the market can thus act as a negative quality signal to testify of this. Second,
in a very elegant and well written contemporary contribution, Kaya and Kim (2015)
5This is the only possibility when we concentrate on equilibria with pure strategies; with mixed
strategies, the low quality seller’s offer is still accepted with probability one but the high quality
seller’s offer could be accepted with non zero probability, as long as it is low enough so that
a low quality seller has no incentive to mimic a high quality seller. We fully characterize mixed
equilibrium strategies in Section 4 and consider standard and inverse dynamics with pure strategies
in Section 5. Our welfare results are in Section 3. We discuss the organization of the paper further
after we have set up the model in Section 2.
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explore a setup where a seller of an asset meets a sequence of randomly arriving
buyers, who make the seller a price offer after (i) receiving a private quality signal
and (ii) observing how long the asset has been for sale. They let the buyers’ prior
beliefs be exogenous in their model and find that, depending on their starting level,
either quality could be traded faster. Nevertheless, inverse dynamics can arise only if
the buyers have initially sufficiently inflated beliefs about asset quality. Otherwise,
standard dynamics prevail. Third, contributing to the study of over-the-counter
trading, Zhu (2012) studies thin markets where there is only a finite number of
potential trading partners. To find a good price in the opaque market, the seller
of an asset can visit multiple potential buyers who make the seller exploding offers
one by one. In contrast to Taylor (1999) and Kaya and Kim (2015), the buyers do
not see the seller’s time on the market but they can recognize if they have been
contacted by the same seller before. In this kind of a non-anonymous market, a
repeat contact by the seller reveals his poor outside options and, thus, makes the
buyer lower the price offer.
It is noteworthy that unlike us none of these papers which find inverse dynam-
ics considers a stationary memoryfree equilibrium and that all of them have an
information linkage between earlier and subsequent encounters with the seller and
some buyers. Moreover, additional degrees of freedom have been gained by not re-
quiring that buyers’ expectations are disciplined by average market quality. This
underscores the difficulty in our objective of finding inverse dynamics in a stationary
Markovian equilibrium for a large anonymous market, where expectations of seller
quality depend on endogenous market conditions. Under inverse trading dynamics,
average market quality is reduced from its entry level, such that the prior can never
be inflated the way it is in Kaya and Kim (2015). That is the reason why we only
find inverse dynamics after shifting our attention to better markets where average
entrant quality is not too low. Our main conceptual innovation is thereby to prove
that also a better market always suffers from illiquidity, that arises from the inter-
play of dynamics and information percolation; the focus on the lemons market only
seems thus artificial. Previously, Kultti et al. (2012) have shown that under dynamic
trade markets can fail under a wider set of parameters than typically considered.
With a public Brownian motion news flow, Daley and Green (2011) have observed
that an endogenous lemons problem arises both in, what we call, the lemons market
and a better market. However, Kultti et al. (2012) and Daley and Green (2011)
both find standard trading dynamics. Our paper is hence the first to tie these ideas
together. Acknowledging that bilaterally arranged meetings often endow the parties
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with some correlated information, we mark that (ii) a large class of dynamic markets
with common values uncertainty becomes inefficient and then show that (ii) inverse
dynamics are possible in a better market but not in the lemons market, without
assumed non-stationarities.
This demonstrates that it may not be an anomaly in data or an outcome of
complicated history dependencies for prices if sellers of better quality appear to
have an easy time of finding a willing trading partner in a market with asymmetric
information. Our paper shows that it could indeed be a steady state phenomenon
in a large decentralized market, although the opposite case is also possible. This
is in accordance with the mixed empirical evidence about the relationship between
unemployment duration and the worker’s hiring probability and the time on the
market and house price (e.g., Heckman and Borjas (1980), Heckman and Singer
(1984), and Asabere and Huffman (1993)).6
2 Model
We consider dynamic trading in a large decentralized market in infinite, discrete
time t. In each time period a unit mass of buyers and equally many sellers enter the
market. All buyers and sellers in the market are then randomly matched in order to
trade. Every seller has one indivisible and imperishable good and every buyer wants
to buy exactly one such good. Even so, it is still possible that due to the asymmetric
information about the value of a seller’s good and the option to delay trade, only
some of the matched buyers and sellers manage to trade with their current trading
partner; they exit the market. The others however remain in the market in hope
to have better luck next time, with some other later trading partner. The next
time period a new generation of buyers and sellers indeed enters the market with
the ones who stayed and all are again randomly matched.7 This periodic trading
process continues ad infinitum. Possible waiting naturally reduces the gains from
6Unrealistic positive or negative expectations and alternating trading patterns might still have
a crucial role to play in real markets with quality uncertainty.
7The matching function from the set of buyers in the market at each time point to the set of
sellers in the market at that time point is one-to-one and onto.
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trade. Buyers and sellers discount future payoffs by common factor δ ∈ (0, 1).8,9
Lemons market and better market
We use a model which allows us to capture the essence of the adverse selection
problem in two parameters λ (”the relative gains from trade”) and g (”the gap”)
whose relative sizes determine how severe the problem is. Half of the entering sellers
has a high quality good, θ = h, and half of them a low quality good, θ = l. The
quality is the seller’s private information. It affects the buyer’s value of the good,
uθ and the seller’s production costs or reservation value, cθ. Namely, if a buyer and
a seller trade for price p, the buyer’s payoff is uθ− p and the seller’s payoff is p− cθ;
they are risk neutral. We assume the following relations for the payoffs:
uh = 1 + g
ch = λ+ g
ul = λ
cl = 0
As standard, the buyer appreciates the good more than the seller, uh > ch and
ul > cl, and both the buyer and the seller value a high quality good more than a low
quality good, uh > ul and ch > cl. The gains from trade in low quality are denoted
by λ = ul − cl > 0 and the gains from trade in high quality by 1− λ = uh − ch > 0;
their total if fixed to unity. The gap in between is denoted by g = ch − ul ≥ 0.
Together with our simplifying assumption that half of the entering sellers has a high
quality good, this implies that we can indeed use λ to adjust the relative gains from
8Our basic model of a large decentralized market is much like in Moreno and Wooders (2010).
The main differences come in the bilateral meetings: we add the shared signal and let the seller
make the take-it-or-leave-it price offer whereas they have no signal and they let the buyer make the
take-it-or-leave-it price offer; we also let the buyers and sellers be matched every time period. They
only study the lemons market and find the standard dynamics as a unique stationary equilibrium
outcome of their model.
9Another somewhat resembling model is Lauermann and Wolinsky (2016) which, however, an-
alyzes a static market and different research questions. The common traits are that the uninformed
party views a signal (which might be either seen by both parties or observed by only this party)
and that also the informed party can affect the price (they bargain over it). The key difference
is the payoff structure because they only consider cases where the buyer’s value is known; this
ensures efficient equilibria.
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trade and the gap g for the severeness of the adverse selection problem.10
We distinguish between the lemons market and what we call a better market.
Definition 1 The lemons market has g > 1− λ.
The lemons market is characterized by a large gap between the high cost, ch,
and the low utility, ul, and low gains from trade in high quality relative to those in
low quality.
Definition 2 A better market has g ≤ 1− λ.
In the lemons market, the buyer’s expected utility of trading with a random
seller is thus below high quality seller’s reservation value
E(u) =
1
2
(1 + g) +
1
2
λ < λ+ g = ch,
whereas, in a better market, the buyer’s expected utility of average quality in the
market is above high quality seller’s reservation value
E(u) =
1
2
(1 + g) +
1
2
λ ≥ λ+ g = ch.
In other words, in the static Walrasian market where all the goods must be traded
for one price without delay, the lemons market fails for certain but a better market
may not. This is also depicted in Figure 1. It displays the total supply and total
demand in a static Walrasian market with one generation of buyers and sellers, half
with a high quality good and half with a low quality good. In the lemons market
(left panel),11 λ+g is always larger than E(u). Hence, there is no price that equates
the supply and demand. High quality does not trade as the lowest price for which
high quality sellers are willing to trade, λ + g, is above the highest price for which
buyers are willing to trade, E(u). Note additionally that, if those better goods are
now withdrawn from the market, as the story often proceeds, the average quality
unravels and the problem becomes even worse. Low quality could still be traded for
prices p ∈ [0, λ]. In a better market (right panel),12 any of the prices p ∈ [E(u), λ]
however equates the supply and demand.
Remark 1 In a static Walrasian market, the total trade surplus is S = 1
2
λ in the
10It is clear that none of our qualitative results would change if the numbers of entering low
quality sellers and high quality sellers would not be the same; this choice just allows us the simple
parametrization with only λ and g.
11For the picture we used λ = 0.67 and g = 0.5.
12For the picture we used λ = 0.33 and g = 0.5.
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lemons case and S = 1
2
λ+ 1
2
(1− λ) = 1 in a better case.
Generally, our dynamic market differs from a static Walrasian market in that
different qualities can be traded (i) at different expected rates and (ii) for different
expected prices. In particular, if a buyer or a seller fails to trade in a certain period,
there is still a chance to trade later on. This implies that both the average quality in
the market is endogenous (it could deviate either up or down from E(u) in the static
Walrasian market) and the buyers and sellers’ outside options are endogenous (they
might raise from zero in a static Walrasian market). It is therefore not immediate
from the outset whether our market should work better or worse than a static
Walrasian market. Intuitively, a rise in the average market quality would boost
trade because the adverse selection problem would then be more relaxed whereas a
rise in the outside options slows down trade as the trading partners become more
selective. We also give the matched buyer and seller additional opportunities for
information transmission prior to trade.
Figure 1: Supply (S) and demand (D) in a static Walrasian market: examples of
the lemons market (left) and a better market (right).
Meeting between buyer and seller
As a natural coordination device, it is assumed that when a buyer and a seller meet
in order to trade, they first draw a new shared signal s ∈ [0, 1] from a quality-specific
distribution, Fh or Fl, corresponding the seller’s quality. Then, the seller makes the
buyer a price offer, p ∈ [cl, uh], which the buyer either accepts, a = 1, or rejects,
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a = 0. If the buyer accepts the offer, they trade for this price and exit the market
but, if the buyer rejects the offer, they return back to the market.
Note that, as the shared signal is observable by both the buyer and the seller, it
may condition all of the later actions of their meeting, i.e. the seller’s price offer and
the buyer’s acceptance probability of a price offer. Nevertheless, because the signals
and the actions in a meeting not observable by outsiders, they have no effect on any
of the following meetings in which the buyer and seller might engage. Signals from
earlier meetings are therefore not part of relevant trading history.13
The distribution functions Fθ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] are continuous and supported on
the unit interval [0, 1] = cl{s|fθ(s) > 0}14, where fθ denotes the density function
related to Fθ. It is assumed that a higher signal is indicative of a higher quality and
that extreme signals are perfectly revealing:
Assumption 1
∂
∂s
fh(s)
fl(s)
≥ 0 for all s,
and
lim
s→0
fh(s)
fl(s)
= 0,
and
lim
s→1
fh(s)
fl(s)
=∞.
The first part of this assumption just says that the signals s satisfy the standard
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). Observe also that, by the second part
of this assumption and by continuity, any positive likelihood ratio is attainable under
an appropriately chosen signal s ∈ (0, 1).15
Notice that before the signal, information is perfectly asymmetric as standard.
However, after the value of the signal is revealed, also the buyer has a bit of in-
formation about the seller’s quality. As the signals are inexact, the buyer’s belief
E(uθ|s) is nevertheless likely to be biased. Moreover, as the signal is shared by both
parties, the seller knows exactly what the bias E(uθ|s) − uθ is. This can have an
13This lack of information linkage between different meetings in the market distinguishes our
work from earlier settings where inverse dynamics arise, e.g., Taylor (1999), Kaya and Kim (2015)
and Zhu (2012).
14The closure of a set A contains all the points a whose every neighborhood B(a) intersects
with the set A: cl(A) = {a|∀B(a) : A ∩B(a) 6= ∅} where B(a) is an arbitrary open set such that
a ∈ B(a).
15This implies that it is possible for both high and low quality sellers to emit also a highly
misleading signal, Eγ(u|s) ≈ ul = λ for θ = h and γh ∈ (0, 1) or Eγ(u|s) ≈ uh = 1 for θ = l and
γh ∈ (0, 1).
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effect on the following signaling game. Because the signals are noisy, the bias and
the incentives to trade could thus vary from one meeting to another.
Namely, recall that in a static Walrasian market, there is no trade between a
buyer and a seller if the buyer’s beliefs are too low compared to the seller’s beliefs:
if the buyer estimates her valuation is E(u) but the seller knows the value is higher,
1 + g. Here the situation is basically the same but more subtle. First, if the buyer’s
beliefs are too low after the shared signal, the seller has still a chance to affect them
by the price offer. Second, both have also a chance to wait until they get a more
favorable, higher signal. They need not trade in their first match.
Timing, strategies, equilibria, and organization of paper
The timing within a period can now be captured compactly by:
t.1 Entry of new buyers and sellers,
t.2 Buyers and sellers are matched,
t.3 Meetings of these matched pairs,
m.1 a shared signal is drawn and shown to this pair,
m.2 the seller offers buyer a price,
m.3 the buyer accepts the price or rejects the price,
t.4 Exit (if trade) or stay (no trade).
We concentrate on stationary Markovian equilibria in pure or randomized be-
havioral strategies σ = (σh, σl, σb): (i) The sellers’ (mixed) strategies σθ(p, s) =
Pr(pθ < p|s) : [0, 1] → ∆ [0, 1 + g] map a price distribution to every signal s for
high quality sellers, θ = h, and low quality sellers, θ = l, respectively. (i) The
buyers’ (mixed) strategies σb(p, s) = Pr(a = 1|p, s) : [0, 1 + g] × [0, 1] → ∆ {0, 1}
map an acceptance probability to each pair (p, s) of a price and a shared signal.
The solution concept that we apply is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). A
PBE is a pair (σ,pi) that consists of a strategy profile σ and a belief system pi
such that (i) the strategy profile σ is consistent with sequential rationality given
the belief system pi and (ii) the belief system pi is derived from the strategy profile
σ whenever possible. To capture the full set of stationary Markovian PBE in this
signaling game, we consider maximal punishments off the equilibrium path.16
16All PBE we consider satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
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The rest of this paper is structured followingly: We first prove in Section 3 that
there exists no efficient equilibrium in the lemons market nor in a better market
when there is a possibility to delay trade and additional coordinating information
given by the shared signal. We then move on to characterize the full set of equilibria
for exogenous average quality in the market and outside options in Section 4. In
furtherance of generality, this is done using mixed strategies.
We thereby study what kinds of dynamics can be sustained when average market
quality and outside options arise endogenously in a stationary Markovian equilib-
rium. With pure strategies, we prove in Section 5 that in the lemons market only
standard dynamics result from this but in a better market also inverse dynamics are
possible.17 In the next two Sections 2.1 and 2.2 we show how the average market
quality and outside options are determined in an equilibrium.
2.1 Average quality in market is endogenous
In this section we show how the average quality in the market adjusts from its entry
level value if there are possible differences in the relative liquidity of low quality
goods and high quality goods. This adjustment will constrain equilibrium behavior
in the long run in important ways because the quality in the market pins down also
the buyer’s beliefs about an average seller’s quality. Later we prove that it is the
key factor preventing us from obtaining inverse dynamics in the lemons market in
Section 5 and the key factor working against us in this attempt also in a better
market.
Note that, if high quality goods are less liquid than low quality goods (standard
dynamics), their share goes up as they keep accumulating in the market and the
buyers therefore become more optimistic about the quality of the sellers they meet;
the opposite takes place if the low quality is traded faster (inverse dynamics). We
next show what these buyer’s beliefs are (i) before the signal (and before the price)
and (i) after the signal (but before the price). Thereafter, depending on whether the
sellers use separating pricing strategies, also the price offer can affect the buyer’s
beliefs.
To keep the market stock of each quality mθ constant as required in a stationary
equilibrium, the (exogenous) per period entry flow of each quality, 1/2, should equal
the (endogenous) per period exit flow of that quality, τθmθ:
17Inverse dynamics do not arise in a lemons market with mixed strategies either.
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mθ =
1
2τθ
. (1)
The exit rate is now simply given by trade probability
τθ =
∫ 1+g
0
∫ 1
0
σ?b (p, s)dσ
?
θ(p, s)dFθ(s), (2)
where σ?b and σ
?
θ denote the optimal mixed strategies.
Hence, before the signal is observed but without any further revelation by the
price offer, the expected buyer value of a random product equals
Eγ(u) =
mh
mh +ml︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:γ
(1 + g) +
ml
mh +ml︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−γ
λ. (3)
After the signal is viewed, on the other hand, the expected buyer value of pur-
chasing from that particular seller is given by Bayesian updating
Eγ(u|s) := mhfh(s)
mhfh(s) +mlfl(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:γ(s)
(1 + g) +
mlfl(s)
mhfh(s) +mlfl(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−γ(s)
λ. (4)
Note that, the probabilities of that the seller has a high quality good can also be
expressed as
γ =
1
1 + τh
τl
and γ(s) =
1
1 + τh
τl
fl(s)
fh(s)
, (5)
before the signal and after the signal, respectively, and the average entrant quality
is given by
E 1
2
(u) =
1
2
(1 + g) +
1
2
λ.
2.2 Values of outside options are endogenous
In this section we present the buyer’s problem and the seller’s problem. Once
matched with a pair, the buyer and the seller each solve their respective optimal
stopping problem: both of them could either trade with their current partner and
pocket the related immediate payoff or turn back to the market and keep on search-
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ing in order to trade with some later trading partner. In particular, the seller in
our model could offer such a high price that the buyer would always reject it; for
simplicity, when a seller does so we just say that the seller has quit the meeting
without trading.
As is standard in dynamic optimization problems, any solution to both optimal
stopping problems will induce some continuation values for the buyer and the seller.
They were absent in a static market and can now reduce the trading incentives. The
values of these endogenous outside options are denoted by δVb for buyers and by
δVθ for sellers. A larger value of outside options makes it obviously less attractive
to trade. In Section 3 we show that even in a better market the outside options will
be inflated in such a way that it will be impossible to sustain efficient trading for
the lowest signals.
A buyer, who has been made a price offer p, decides whether to accept it or
reject it by solving the following Bellman equation
Vb(p, s) := max
σb∈[0,1]
σb (Eγ(u|p, s)− p) + (1− σb) δVb. (6)
The optimal solution to this problem is
σ?b (p, s) =

1 for Eγ(u|p, s)− p > δVb,
[0, 1] for Eγ(u|p, s)− p = δVb,
0 for Eγ(u|p, s)− p < δVb.
(7)
A seller, who is endowed with a product of quality θ = h, l, chooses the price
offer by solving the following Bellman equation
Vθ(s) := max
p∈[0,1]
σ?b (p, s) (p− cθ) + (1− σ?b (p, s)) δVθ, (8)
or, equivalently, the simpler problem
max
p∈[0,1]
σ?b (p, s) (p− cθ − δVθ) . (9)
To refer to them all at once, we can collect them into V = (Vb, Vh, Vl).
The buyer’s problem is to sample one seller at a time sequentially, drawing new
payoffs, Eγ(u−p|s), for each new seller they encounter. These payoffs are distributed
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independently across the bilateral meetings according to a given distribution with
no recall option.18 It is well known that the solution to such an optimal stopping
problem is characterized by a cutoff policy where, if the expected payoff is below
the cutoff, the buyer accepts the offer but, if the expected payoff is above the cutoff,
the buyer rejects the offer. At an optimum, this cutoff will be equal to the value of
outside options, δVb.
The seller’s problem is instead like that of a monopolist whose costs are cθ +δVθ,
i.e., the seller reservation value plus the seller continuation value, and the demand is
given by σ?b (p, s), i.e., the probability of trade for a given price. Observe, however,
that in contrast to the standard monopoly problem, the seller’s problem is not very
well behaved in this case where the price can also act as a signal of quality: due to the
usual flexibility with off path beliefs, even a slightest deviation from the anticipated
price offer can make the buyer extremely suspicious of the seller’s quality and thus
reject the price offer.19
Indeed, note that equilibrium analysis pins down σ?b (p, s) only for equilibrium
price-signal pairs (p, s). For those pairs that lie off the equilibrium path, we let the
buyers’ beliefs collapse to as negative as possible: we let the buyer in those cases
conjecture that the seller’s quality is low for sure. Another way to put this is to say
that we analyze equilibria with maximal punishments off the equilibrium path. In
this way we can look for the possibility of sustaining inverse dynamics in the largest
possible equilibrium set, all of which are consistent with the Intuitive Criterion (Cho
and Kreps, 1987).20
Based on Section 2.1 and Section 2.2, a stationary Markovian equilibrium can
be defined as follows:
Definition 3 A stationary Markovian PBE is a tuple (σ,V,m, τ , Eγ(u), Eγ(u|s),
Eγ(u|p, s)) such that:
18To see where these payoffs come from, note that each date the buyer draws a new signal
s from a signal distribution that is a mixture of high and low signal distributions, Fl and Fh.
Furthermore, the seller’s pricing strategies, σ?l and σ
?
h, are stationary for all possible signal values
by construction.
19For instance, under the usual flexibility with beliefs off the equilibrium path in games of
signaling, the price elasticity of the demand,
∂σ?b (p,s)
∂p
p
σ?b (p,s)
, can get infinite for some (p, s). This
illustrates that it is generally not possible to resort to, say, basic tools of calculus to tackle the
seller’s problem.
20For completeness, we present the Intuitive Criterion in Appendix. Observe that this standard
refinement is not violated by the kind of extreme beliefs we just described because typically, if
low quality sellers gain from a deviation when taken for high quality sellers, then also high quality
sellers would do so.
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1. Buyer strategy: σ?b (p, s) maximizes (6) given Eγ(u|p, s) and Vb for all (p, s).
2. Seller strategies: σ?θ(p, s) maximizes (8) given σ
?
b (p, s) and Vθ for all (p, s).
3. Buyer value: Vb satisfies (6).
4. Seller values: Vθ satisfy (8).
5. Stocks: mθ satisfy (1).
6. Flows: τθ satisfy (2).
7. Average quality in the market and buyers’ beliefs: (i) Eγ(u) satisfies (3) where
γ is given by (5), (ii) Eγ(u|s) satisfies (4) where γ(s) is given by (5) for all s
and (iii) Eγ(u|p, s) are consistent with σ?θ(p, s) for all (p, s) on the equilibrium
path and with the Intuitive Criterion (see App. for Def. 7) for all (p, s) off
the equilibrium path.
3 Welfare
As a necessary ingredient for the our later analysis of trading dynamics, we first
make some general remarks about the effects of the shared signal on welfare. Since
the traders are paired each period and there are strictly positive gains from trade in
both qualities, efficient trading requires that every match results in trade. If there is
instead a possible delay in trade, total surplus depends on the length of time it takes
to trade in different qualities; inefficiency is manifested in decreased liquidity. While
also the transition path to the steady state might matter, for stationary equilibria
the standard welfare measure is the weighted sum of the values to a generation of
buyers and sellers (e.g., Moreno and Wooders (2010, p. 388)):
S = Vb +
1
2
Vh +
1
2
Vl =
τh
2
1− λ
1− δ +
τh
2
λ
1− δ .
One of our most striking findings in this paper is now the non-existence of efficient
equilibria both in the lemons market (in which the static Walrasian market fails)
and in a better market (in which the static Walrasian market need not fail) when the
shared signal is added to the game form. This strong result implies that both the
lemons market and a better market are, in effect, negatively affected by asymmetric
information. Interestingly, this general finding does not even depend on whether we
have a signaling game or screening game, or some other form of bargaining in the
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bilateral meetings; the proof makes this clear. Inefficiency arises merely from the
interplay of dynamics and the noisy information revelation:
Proposition 1 Any equilibrium is inefficient. (i) In a market where g > 0 the
following statement holds: ∃s′ ∈ (0, 1) : ∀s < s′ : Eγ(u|s) < λ + g; buyers and high
quality sellers cannot hence trade with probability one for so low signals s < s′. (ii)
In a market where g = 0 the following statements hold:
1. If Vh = 0, then Vb > 0. If Vb = 0, then Vh > 0.
2. Suppose that Vb > 0. Then, ∃s′ ∈ (0, 1) : ∀s < s′ : Eγ(u|s)− p < δVb even for
p = λ+ g (the minimal price for which a high quality seller may sell); a buyer
would thus never accept so high a price.
3. Suppose that Vh > 0. Then, ∃s′ ∈ (0, 1) : ∀s < s′ : p − λ − g < δVh even for
p = Eγ(u|s) (the maximal price for which a buyer might buy); a high quality
seller would thus never offer so low a price.
Proof. Observe first that after the signal s ∈ [0, 1] is viewed but without any
costly revelation by the price offer, the maximal price that a buyer would be willing
to accept is Eγ(u|s)−δVb (to compensate the buyer for the loss of the search option)
and the minimal price that a high quality seller would be willing to offer is λ+g+δVh
(to compensate for the cost and the loss of the search option). For the lowest possible
signal s = 0 these prices would be λ − δVb for the buyer and λ + g + δVh for the
seller. In the lemons market and in a better market that have a positive gap g > 0,
it is thus immediate that there is no price that both could agree on in some open
the neighborhood of the lowest possible signal s = 1.
For the other case where the gap is zero g = 0, note that all goods can be
traded in the first match, as efficient trading requires, only if there is a price p(s) ∈
[λ+ δVh, Eγ(u|s)− δVb], that is acceptable to both the buyer and the seller for
almost all s, especially, for the cases in which Eγ(u|s) is close to λ. This is possible
only if the following conditions hold: (i) δVb = 0 and, thus, p(s) = Eγ(u|s), for
almost all s, since the use of any price below it would raise the buyer value Vb over
zero and (ii) δVh = 0 and, thus, p(s) = λ, for almost all s, since the use of any
price above it would raise the seller value Vh over zero. But (i) and (ii) are clearly
incompatible because λ < Eγ(u|s) for all s ∈ (0, 1).21
21While we do not cover the case with a negative gap g < 0, it is clear from this proof that
the inefficiency result may not extend to that case. Indeed in the setup where only the cost varies
with type by Lauermann and Wolinsky (2016), the market is always efficient. Their paper studies
information aggregation by prices.
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To complete the proof, note that signaling or screening by the price offer does
not help in this case because raising beliefs up from Eγ(u|s) to some Eγ(u|p, s), that
would need to be higher, is not possible without inducing welfare costs in terms
of possible delay in trade: higher prices cannot be accepted for certain because,
otherwise, low quality sellers would have an incentive to mimic high quality sellers,
which would violate the underlying incentive constraints. Hence, there exists no
equilibrium where everything is traded in the first match. 
When the gap is positive g = ch− ul > 0, it is intuitive that this wedge between
low utility ul = λ and high cost ch = λ + g makes it impossible to trade under
the lowest most signal realizations s ≈ 0 because the beliefs are then about as low
as they can be, Eγ(u|s) ≈ ul; mark that under the assumed information structure
there is a non negligible probability of observing so low signals s ∈ [1, ], for some
tiny  > 0, ever for high quality sellers, supp(Fh) = supp(Fl) = [0, 1]. Without any
such gap g = ch−ul = 0, however, the insight behind this result is as follows: Since
additional information revelation makes it impossible to trade all goods in the first
match without giving a fraction of the information rents either to buyers or to high
quality sellers, it makes it also impossible to trade all goods for the lowest signals,
which would provide them with almost no rents. With positive outside options, it
is thus indeed better either for the buyers or for the high quality sellers to wait for
higher signals than to trade under an unfavorably low one. This implies that the
trade will break down for the lowest signal values.
In an economics job market application for example (which may not map one
for one with the model but serves to illustrate the insights), if a candidate who
considers himself or herself of high quality utterly fails in the job talk, the person
can still try to signal his or her quality in negotiating the contractual terms with
the department or put the hope in the other flyouts, the market scramble or in the
next year. Since a high quality candidate however has rather high outside options of
employment elsewhere, ch, and in the economics job market, δVh, there is no point
in accepting a lower salary offer or inferior contract terms due to the failure – a
post doc with the same teaching load as for the aspired assistant professor position.
Thereby, since it is more difficult for say the micro fraction of the hiring committee
to persuade the macro fraction to back a micro candidate who did poorly in the
job talk, this can lead to an inefficiently long job search process; also high quality
candidates sometimes do badly. Likewise, low quality candidates might also have
their moment of luck earning them a good placement.
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We think that these effects of correlated information on dynamic trading are
important and unexpected. They show that the information based coordination in
bilateral meetings can be a two-edged-sword. Most of the time signals take the
parties beliefs’ about the seller’s quality closer together. This is fine because it
makes the sorting problem easier for the buyers.
Nevertheless, because the signals are noisy, sometimes they also take the parties’
beliefs quite far apart. While this is rare, from time to time a high quality seller can
make a very bad impression on a buyer. If this disagreement among a buyer and a
high quality seller is strong, it will be best for both the buyer and the seller to split
up since they cannot agree on the terms of trade.22
In contrast, with either fully asymmetric or fully symmetric information, all gains
from trade could still be realized in a better market:
Remark 2 Consider a better market where the shared signal is uninformative.
Then, there exist a continuum of efficient equilibria where the price offer that is made
by both sellers is always p ∈ [λ+ g, Eγ(u)]. All goods are traded in the first match.
The buyer value is Vb = Eγ(u)− p ≥ 0 and the seller values are Vh = p− λ− g ≥ 0
and Vl = p > Vh ≥ 0.
Remark 3 Consider any market where the shared signal is perfectly revealing.
Then, there exist a unique efficient equilibrium where the price offer made by high
quality sellers is ph = 1 + g and that made by low quality sellers is pl = λ. All goods
are traded in the first match. The buyer value is Vb = 0 and the seller values are
Vh = 1− λ and Vl = λ.
Corollary 1 The shared signal can be welfare-reducing.
We note that the underlying idea is akin to the so called Hirshleifer effect, which
refers to a decrease in overall welfare with additional information as opportunities for
risk sharing are removed (Hirshleifer, 1971). Later we demonstrate more specifically
that in a better market the problem with shared signals is that pooling no longer
constitutes an equilibrium for the lowest signals. In a better market, shared signals
thus eliminate the above efficient pooling equilibria.
To show next that the shared signal can also have welfare improving effects,
we consider the lemons market where the gains from trade are the same for both
qualities, i.e., λ = 1−λ = 1
2
. To make sure the average entrant quality is low enough
for a lemons market, we assume that the gap is twice as large as this, i.e., g = 1. We
22On the flip side, a low quality seller can also make a very good impression on a buyer. This
generates the inverse trading dynamics we explore in Section 5.
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then compare trading in pure strategies with no shared signal, the standard case in
other words, and with a shared signal distributed as
fh(s) = 2s for all s ∈ [0, 1] and fl(s) = 2− 2s for all s ∈ [0, 1] ,
such that the increasing likelihood ratio is given by
fh(s)
fl(s)
=
s
1− s such that lims→0
fh(s)
fl(s)
→ 0 and lim
s→1
fh(s)
fl(s)
→∞,
which satisfies all our previously made assumptions.
It is next rather easy to become convinced that without a shared signal and with
only pure strategies the following cyclic trading pattern is an equilibrium and indeed
the surplus maximizing one: in odd periods t = 2k − 1, only low quality is traded
for price p = λ and, in even periods t = 2k, both low and high quality is trades for
price p = λ+g. This empties the market so that the same cycle could then continue
anew. Average utility over this cycle would hence be
2S = λ+ δ(1− λ) + 1.
Note that, in odd periods, average quality in the market is
1
2
(1 + g) +
1
2
λ = 1 +
1
4
<
3
2
= λ+ g
whereas, in even periods, average market quality is higher
2
3
(1 + g) +
1
3
λ =
8
6
+
1
6
=
3
2
= λ+ g
because the high quality from the earlier period remains still there. Moreover,
observe that in this bordering case, where the average market quality equals high
cost in even time periods, both high quality sellers and buyers just break even:
V tb = V
t
h = 0 for all t. The full surplus goes to the low quality sellers. To make sure
that it is indeed an equilibrium for them to accept the lower price p = λ in odd
periods and not just wait for the the higher price p = λ + g in even periods, the
common discount factor has to be sufficiently low so as to guarantee that
λ ≥ δ(λ+ g), which gives δ ≤ 1
3
.
This is of course a rather low number for δ but it suffices for our purposes –
to show that the availability of the shared signal can also increase welfare. If the
20
common discount factor is higher, a resembling equilibrium would still exits but
then in between the periods when prices are p = λ (only low quality trades) and
p = λ + g (also high quality trades), there would be an intermediate market freeze
period in which no seller trades before the final clearing period. This equilibrium is
essentially as in the example by Moreno and Wooders (2010, pp. 393-394).
Also to give the reader a flavor of how our model works, we are going to contrast
this next with the equilibrium payoff attainable in exactly the same lemons market
with pure strategies but now with a shared signal available in the bilateral meetings.
We postulate that the following trading strategies then constitute an equilibrium:
If the signal is below s′ = 2
3
, low quality sellers make a separating price offer, pl =
λ− δVb, and high quality sellers make a separating price offer, say, ph = 1 + g− δVb,
where we are later going to derive an upper bound for the buyer value Vb.
In anticipation of our subsequent results in the following section, both of these
prices are chosen in the way that the buyer just breaks even. To prevent low quality
sellers from mimicking high quality sellers with simple pure strategies, pl must be
accepted and ph must be rejected. However, if the signal is above s
′ = 2
3
, both sellers
make a pooling price offer p = λ + g. Buyers accept it as the expected utility for
that high signals is at least
E 1
2
(u|s = s′) 1
1 + 1
2
(1 + g) +
1
2
1 + 1
2
λ =
1
1 + 1
2
2 +
1
2
1 + 1
2
1
2
=
3
2
= λ+ g,
where we have used in the denominator fl(s
′)
fh(s′)
= 1−s
′
s′ =
1− 2
3
2
3
= 1
2
. Note that we did
not even take into account the fact that average market quality is going to be higher
than average quality at entry in this kind of an equilibrium; above we have just set
τh
τl
= 1. Specifically, if we assumed instead that the described trading pattern is a
stationary equilibrium where τh
τl
=
1−Fh( 23 )
1
= 5
9
, that would then obviously give an
even higher expected utility to buyers
Eγ(u|s = s′) = 1
1 + 5
9
1
2
(1 + g) +
5
9
1
2
1 + 5
9
1
2
λ =
1
1 + 5
9
1
2
2 +
5
9
1
2
1 + 5
9
1
2
1
2
>
3
2
= λ+ g.
We can now approximate buyer value from upward by
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Vb =
1
1 + 5
9
1
2
((
1− Fh
(
2
3
))
(1 + g − (λ+ g)) + Fh
(
2
3
)
δVb
)
+
5
9
1
2
1 + 5
9
1
2
((
1− Fl
(
2
3
))
(λ− (λ+ g)) + Fl
(
2
3
)
δVb
)
=
1
1 + 5
9
1
2
(
5
9
(1− λ) + 4
9
δVb
)
+
5
9
1
2
1 + 1
2
(
1
9
(−g) + 8
9
δVb
)
=⇒ Vb =
5(1− 1
9
)
23− 8(1 + 5
9
)δ
,
and calculate from this a lower bound on seller value
Vl = Fl(s
′) (λ− δVb) + (1− Fl(s′)) (λ+ g) = 1
9
(λ− δVb) + 8
9
(λ+ g).
It should be clear from this construction that high quality sellers and buyers
have always an incentive to stick with their postulated equilibrium strategies; in
particular, any off equilibrium path offers will be rejected. However, low quality
sellers who get a low signal s < s′ face a potentially non trivial tradeoff between
offering a revealing price λ − δVb or waiting in hope to draw a higher signal in the
future and, therefore, obtaining their continuation value δVl; this value also accounts
for the possibility of pooling with high quality sellers for price λ + g. Low quality
sellers are thus willing to make the separating price offer pl if
λ− δVb ≥ δ1
9
(λ− δVb) + δ8
9
(λ+ g).
Which gives us an upper bound for the common discount factor δ′ ≈ 0.310, that
thus guarantees the existence of this second kind of an equilibrium.
We can thus conclude this exercise by juxtaposing the average surplus over the
cycle in the first equilibrium,
S1 =
1
2
(
1
2
+
1
2
)
+
1
2
(
1
2
+
δ
2
)
=
1
2
+
1
4
(1 + δ),
and lower bound for the surplus in the second equilibrium,
S2 =
1
2
+
1
2
5
9
.
It is clear that the latter surplus is greater than the former surplus if the common
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discount factor is small δ < 1
9
.
Corollary 2 The shared signal can be welfare-enhancing.
It is worth mentioning anew that, if low quality sellers are patient, they might
have no incentive to make their separating price offer but instead wait until they
get a shared signal that is high enough to allow them pool with high quality sellers.
Namely, if that were feasible in the long run, it would shift us from standard trading
dynamics to the case of inverse dynamics because high quality would then trade
more often than low quality, τh = 1−Fh(s′) versus τl = 1−Fl(s′). We explore when
this is actually possible in more detail in Section 5. Further, note that in the above
examples we confined our analysis to pure strategies only. In the next Section 4 we
consider trading also in randomized strategies.
4 Characterization of equilibrium strate-
gies with exogenous average quality and
outside options
This is now the paper’s most technically challenging section. In this section we
characterize the full set of equilibria which could arise in the bilateral meetings under
any particular, favorable circumstances and suggest some natural refinements for the
equilibrium set. We also give conditions for existence.23 Observe that this is still
basically a static problem because the average quality in the market γ is determined
by the subsequent trading history and the outside options V are determined by
what is done in the following continuation equilibrium; both of them are hence fixed
when the matched buyer and seller choose their actions. Especially, neither γ nor V
depends on what is done in the specific bilateral meeting, whose size is zero relative
to the larger market. Thus, we can take the average quality γ, the outside options
V, and the shared signal s, that realizes in this meeting, as our starting point and
study what kinds of equilibria are sustainable with this data.24
Definition 4 A meeting-specific PBE with exogenous data (γ,V, s) is a tuple
(σ, Eγ(u), Eγ(u|s), Eγ(u|p, s)) such that:
23As for notation, here we use the 4-parameter notation, uθ and cθ, and not the simpler 2-
parameter notation, λ and g, which comes in handy in later fixed point analysis in Section 5.
24Note that, while some of the following pricing patterns may not be sustainable in a stationary
equilibrium, they could arise more generally in an appropriate non-stationary equilibrium.
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1. Buyer strategy: σ?b (p, s) maximizes (6) given Eγ(u|p, s) for all p.
2. Seller strategies: σ?θ(p, s) maximizes (8) given σ
?
b (p, s) for all p.
3. Average quality in the market and buyers’ beliefs: (i) Eγ(u) satisfies (3) and
Eγ(u|s) satisfies (4) where γ and γ(s) are both consistent with (5),25 and (ii)
Eγ(u|p, s) are consistent with σ?θ(p, s) for all p on the equilibrium path and
with the Intuitive Criterion (see App. for Def. 7) for all p off the equilibrium
path.
These meeting-specific equilibria come here in three different kinds: pooling, sep-
arating, and semi-pooling, in which a seller is mixing between pooling and separting.
Withing each type, there might exist a continuum of equilibria that are consistent
with the Intuitive Criterion. Most deviations can be attributed to low quality sellers
because, if the sellers of high quality would benefit from a deviation, then also the
sellers of low quality would benefit from that deviation: it is thus perfectly reason-
able for the buyer to expect that the deviant seller is a low quality seller.26 As said
in some cases we also simply say that the seller ”quits” – whether the sellers’ pricing
strategies happen to be pooling, separating or semi-pooling. The idea is that the
seller can also make such a high price offer, p = 1 + g for example, that the buyer
almost never accepts it. The inevitable end result is then that the seller goes back
to the market and continues searching for better outside options.
Definition 5 Consider a meeting-specific PBE with exogenous (γ,V, s).
1. A profile of pricing strategies σ?h(p, s), σ
?
l (p, s) ∈ ∆ [cl, uh] is pooling if both
sellers only make pooling offers, i.e., if supp(σ?h(p, s)) = supp(σ
?
l (p, s)).
2. A profile of pricing strategies σ?h(p, s), σ
?
l (p, s) ∈ ∆ [cl, uh] is separating if both
sellers only make separating offers, i.e., if supp(σ?h(p, s))∩ supp(σ?l (p, s)) = ∅.
Otherwise, a profile of pricing strategies is described as semi-pooling.
Observe that our data and, in particular, the outside options and the shared
signal now determines which kinds of meeting-specific equilibria are supportable:
Proposition 2 Consider a meeting-specific PBE with exogenous (γ,V, s).
25Note that we could think, with no loss of generality, that γ defines through (5) some underlying
τ consistent with it. This τ then, together with the shared signal s, defines γ(s) through (5).
26We later on suggest a way to refine the equilibrium set based on how the sellers would prefer
to coordinate their strategies. The idea is close to that presented by No¨ldeke and Samuelson (1997)
as we apparently end focusing on mixtures of what they call Riley equilibria and Hellwig equilibria.
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1. There exists a pooling equilibrium iff Eγ(u|s)−δVb ≥ ch+δVh (IR− b, IR−h)
and Eγ(u|s) − δVb ≥ cl + δVl (IR − b, IR − l). In a pooling equilibrium,
the price offer p is between max {cl + δVl, ch + δVh} and Eγ(u|s) − δVb. If
p < Eγ(u|s)− δVb and the acceptance probability is given by
σ?b (p, s) = 1 for p < Eγ(u|s)− δVb and
σ?b (p, s) ∈ [0, 1] for p(s) := Eγ(u|s)− δVb.
2. There exists a separating equilibrium iff uh − δVb ≥ ch + δVh (IR− b, IR− h)
and ul− δVb ≥ cl + δVl (IR− b, IR− l). In a separating equilibrium, the price
offers are ph = uh − δVb, for the high quality seller, and pl = ul − δVb, for the
low quality seller, and the acceptance probabilities are given by
σ?b (ph, s) ∈
[
0,
pl − (cl + δVl)
ph − (cl + δVl)
]
and σ?b (pl, s) = 1. (IC − l)
3. There exists a semi-pooling equilibrium iff
ul ≥ cl + δVl + δVb and uh > ch + δVh + δVb, or
Eγ(u|s) > ch + δVh + δVb and Eγ(u|s) > cl + δVl + δVb.
In a semi-pooling equilibrium, except for a knife-edge case cl + δVl = ch + δVh,
there could be at maximum one pooling price p in use and at maximum one
separating price pl or ph in use: If the high quality seller is mixing between p
and ph > p the low quality seller only using p whereas if the low quality seller
is mixing between p and pl < p, the high quality seller is only using p. (See
App. for the full characterization.)
Above IR refer to individual rationality constraints and IC to incentive com-
patibility constraints.
In a pooling equilibrium, both low quality sellers and high quality sellers use the
same price p. If the price leaves the buyer positive surplus, it must be accepted for
probability one; otherwise, the buyer can also mix between accepting and rejecting
the price. For the sellers the best such equilibrium is of course the one where the price
keeps the buyers at their outside options and the buyers accept it for probability
one nonetheless; it combines the best of both worlds.
Note also that, low quality sellers can separate from high quality sellers when-
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ever they want by offering any price below the high cost; high quality sellers would
never use that low prices. High quality sellers cannot do so themselves.27,28 Notwith-
standing, low quality sellers are willing to separate only if their continuation value
is below the payoff they get from trading for their low revealing price. For higher
values of outside options, there does hence not exist a separating equilibrium. The
existence of a pooling equilibrium depends instead on the level of the signal. If the
signal is very high, buyers rest assured that the seller’s quality is high and are thus
willing to accept a higher price.29
In a separating equilibrium, both sellers offer the buyer a revealing price, a
lower price pl for the low quality sellers and a higher price ph for the high quality
sellers. The former is accepted for certain but the latter one has to be accepted
for a probability less than one to stop the low quality sellers from mimicking the
high quality sellers.30 Both prices must additionally keep the buyers at their outside
options to honor buyers and sellers’ optimality conditions.
In a semi-pooling equilibrium, either the low quality sellers mix between a low
and a high price while the high quality sellers only use the high price or the high
quality sellers mix between a low and a high price while the low quality sellers
only use the low price. To prevent the low quality sellers from mimicking, the high
price must be accepted less often than the low price. To keep the buyers mixing
in accepting and rejecting it, they must be kept at their outside options. That is,
several fixed point conditions, i.e., the revenue equivalence condition for the mixing
buyer and the mixing seller, plus, the incentive condition for the low quality seller,
should be holding all at once.
To sum up, the key message of Proposition 2 is that, for any γ ∈ (0, 1) and
assuming quite naturally that uh − δVb > ch + δVh and ch + δVh ≥ cl + δVl, by
27Due to the harsh off the equilibrium path beliefs that would arise as low quality sellers might
also have an incentive to offer those higher prices.
28To be even more precise, if was so that cl + δVl > ch + δVh, high quality seller could separate
by offering p = cl + δVl −  for some tiny  > 0. However, then the cutoff signal for pooling would
be given by E(u|s′) = cl+δVl > ch+δVh so that the high quality seller would only be willing to do
so for low signals s < s′. This would imply that low quality trades only for s ≥ s′ but high quality
trades for all signals. In the long run, this would not generate assumed stationary equilibrium
payoffs cl+ δVl > ch+ δVh. It is a good exercise to show that the payoff that low quality seller gets
from pooling with the high is at most ch plus the payoff that high quality seller gets from pooling
with the low in a stationary equilibrium. Furthermore, this kind of behavior is not an equilibrium
without additional tweaking with tie breaking assumptions because high quality sellers have an
incentive to elevate their price offer until → 0.
29In some cases there may not exist a pooling equilibrium nor a separating equilibrium; then
the only remaining option for sellers is to quit.
30Observe that in many applications there might exist natural ways to interpret or purify the
randomized strategies, for example, by perturbing the players’ payoffs a` la Harsanyi (1973).
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Proposition 1 there always exists a cutoff signal s′ ∈ (0, 1) such that a pooling
equilibrium exists if and only if s ≥ s′, where Eγ(u|s′) − ch = δVh + δVb (the
expected gains from trade must be sufficient to compensate both the high quality
seller and the buyer for the loss of their outside options). A separating equilibrium
exists instead if and only if ul−cl ≥ δVl+δVb (the gains from trade must be sufficient
to compensate both the low quality seller and the buyer for the loss of their outside
options). These constraints for existence are presented in Table 1.
s′ : Eγ(u|s′) = ch + δVh + δVb s ≥ s′ s < s′
ul ≥ cl + δVl + δVb ∃ pooling eq. @ pooling eq.
ul ≥ cl + δVl + δVb ∃ separating eq. ∃ separating eq.
ul < cl + Vl + δVb ∃ pooling eq. @ pooling eq.
ul < cl + Vl + δVb @ separating eq. @ separating eq.
Table 1: Existence of meeting-specific pooling equilibria and separating equilibria.
Now one way to refine the equilibrium set is to concentrate on equilibria that both
types of sellers would like to play if they were able to coordinate to an equilibrium
they both prefer; the idea is like spirit with the concept of undefeated equilibrium
by Mailath et al. (1993) but now we only consider seller payoffs:31
Definition 6 Consider a meeting-specific equilibrium with data d = (γ,V, s).
The equilibrium is seller maximal if there exist no other equilibrium that both sellers
weakly prefer and either high quality sellers or low quality sellers strictly prefer.
Otherwise, the latter equilibrium defeats the former equilibrium.
Remark 4 Consider a meeting-specific PBE with exogenous (γ,V, s).
1. Any pooling equilibrium is defeated by the best pooling equilibrium where the
price offer is p = Eγ(u|s)− δVb and the acceptance probability is σ?b (p, s) = 1.
2. Any separating equilibrium is defeated by the best separating equilibrium where
the acceptance probabilities are
σ?b (ph, s) =
pl − (cl + δVl)
ph − (cl + δVl) and σ
?
b (pl, s) = 1.
31More generally one might want to do a related exercise for stationary equilibria where γ and
V are endogenous. Our initial analysis suggests that, to find the stationary equilibrium with
maximal welfare, the level of the pooling price offer might need to be adjusted so that both the
buyer participation constraint (IR− b) or a seller participation constraint (IR− h) are binding at
the cutoff signal s′ (above it, sellers should pool, below it, they should separate).
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3. Any semi-pooling equilibrium is defeated by the best pooling equilibrium or by
the best separating equilibrium.
4. The best separating equilibrium is defeated by the best pooling equilibrium if
Eγ(u|s)− ch ≥ σ?b (ph, s) (uh − ch) + (1− σ?b (ph, s)) δVh.
5. The best pooling equilibrium is not defeated by the best separating equilibrium.
Crucially, we find that, in search for seller maximal meeting-specific equilibria, it
is possible to ignore as defeated all semi-pooling equilibria and zoom in on the best
pooling equilibrium and the best separating equilibrium. This result arises because
the seller who is mixing in prices has to be indifferent between playing a higher price
and a lower price whereas the other seller would be better off if the ratio in which
the first seller mixes was degenerate; a seller maximal meeting-specific equilibrium
should consequently either be fully pooling or fully separating.
Moreover, if the signal is high (if there exists a pooling equilibrium), all sellers
are best off relying on this costless high signal but, if the signal is low (if there
exists only a separating equilibrium), they need to opt for possibly costly signaling.
Otherwise (if there exists no pooling equilibrium nor a separating equilibrium), they
just quit. Observe also that, if a stationary equilibrium (Def. 3) is constructed of
seller maximal meeting-specific equilibria (Def. 4), a Diamond (1971)-like holdup
result arises and buyers get no rents; buyer value Vb is thus zero.
5 Standard dynamics and inverse dynam-
ics with endogenous average quality and
outside options
In this last section we show as the key result of this paper that inverse dynamics
are possible in a better market but not in the lemons market. Average quality and
outside options are endogenized and we only consider trading with pure strategies.
Note first that obtaining inverse dynamics requires we are in the lowest two rows
of Table 1 where the low quality sellers are no willing to make a separating price
offer. Otherwise, the low quality sellers would have an incentive to guarantee that
they trade in the first match either (i) by pooling with the high quality sellers, for
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some of the highest signals when this is possible, or (ii) by making a revealingly low
price offer. Since Proposition 1 demonstrates that all high quality goods cannot be
traded in the first match, this would imply that low quality is traded faster than
high quality. A necessary condition for inverse dynamics is thus
λ < δVb + δVl. (10)
5.1 Lemons market
As separating equilibria cannot exist in this case and semi-pooling equilibria are
infeasible with pure strategies, the only way of trading here is to sell both types of
goods for the same pooling price p(s) for some strict subset of signals S ⊂ [0, 1]. By
Proposition 1 we know that the largest set of signals is [s′, 1], where the value of the
cutoff s′ ∈ (0, 1) is given by
s′ : Eγ(u|s′) = max {δVl + δVb, λ+ g + δVh + δVb} . (11)
In consequence, if the sellers pool whenever they can, average quality in the
market adjusts until
γ =
1
1 + τh
τl
=
1
1 + 1−Fh(s
′)
1−Fl(s′)
.
However, there could also in principle be gaps in the set of signals for which the
sellers are trading. The set of feasible trading signals [s′, 1] could be partitioned into
a set of actual trading signals ST ⊂ S and another set of signals SNT ⊂ for which
the sellers do not trade due to harsh off path beliefs.
ST = [s0, s1] ∪ [s2, s3] ∪ . . . ∪ [sk, sk+1] ∪ . . . where s0 ≥ s′.
Nevertheless, due to the monotone likelihood ration property, fh(sk)
fl(sk)
< fh(sk+1)
fl(sk+1)
for sk < sk+1, introducing these kinds of gaps of length lk = sk+1 − sk can increase
the average market quality only up to a certain point because
τh
τl
=
∑∞
k=1(Fh(s2k−1)− Fh(s2(k−1)))∑∞
k=1(Fl(s2k−1)− Fl(s2(k−1)))
≥
∑∞
k=1 fh(s2(k−1))l2(k−1)∑∞
k=1 fl(s2(k−1))l2(k−1)
≥ fh(s
′)
fl(s′)
.
In the lemons market where g > 1 − λ, there could thus only exist stationary
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equilibria where low quality is more liquid than high quality. This is because at
the lowest signal s′ for which the sellers are trading if we assume inverse dynamics,
buyer expectations are necessarily below those at entry:
γ(s) =
1
1 + 1−Fh(s
′)
1−Fl(s′)
fl(s′)
fh(s′)
<
1
2
,
because, by the monotone likelihood ratio property,
1− Fh(s′)
fh(s′)
>
1− Fl(s′)
fl(s′)
for all s′,
or because, with the kind of gaps we just described,
γ(s) ≤ 1
1 + fh(s
′)
fl(s′)
fl(s′)
fh(s′)
=
1
2
.
This entails that in the lemons market where the average quality at entry is
already too low to sustain immediate trading the high quality seller cannot be willing
to trade for the highest pooling price offer that the buyer would accept at s′. This
contradicts the possibility of obtaining inverse dynamics.32
Corollary 3 Inverse dynamics cannot arise in the lemons market.
5.2 Better market
For a better market where g ≤ 1−λ we find, as a novelty, that also inverse dynamics
are possible:
Proposition 3 As long as the following limit condition holds in a better market
Eγ(u|s′)− (λ+g) = 1
1 + 1−Fh(s
′)
1−Fl(s′)
fl(s′)
fh(s′)
(1−λ)−
1−Fh(s′)
1−Fl(s′)
fl(s
′)
fh(s′)
1 + 1−Fh(s
′)
1−Fl(s′)
fl(s′)
fh(s′)
g → a > 0 as s′ → 1,
there exists a stationary Markovian equilibrium where high quality is traded faster
than low quality. The equilibrium is characterized by a cutoff signal s′: below the
cutoff, for s < s′, sellers return to the market and, above the cutoff, for s ≥ s′, they
offer a seller maximal price p(s) = Eγ(u|s), that buyers accept with probability one.
32Note that existence is not an issue in this case. There exist for instance a multiplicity of
stationary Markovian equilibria with standard dynamics, where both sellers make a pooling price
offer for higher signals and offer separating prices for lower signals.
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High quality goods are traded with probability 1 − Fh(s′) and low quality goods are
traded with probability 1− Fl(s′), which is lower.
The proof is based on a fixed point argument and on showing that the outside
options to low quality sellers can be bounded away from zero in equilibria like this.
For low enough gains from trade in low quality, λ, the necessary condition (10) for
this kind of an equilibrium can therefore be satisfied.
We can also illustrate this by showing a couple of examples. To make our task
easier, though, we let the pooling price be at a buyer maximal level p(s) = λ + g
instead of the seller maximal level p(s) = Eγ(u|s), that we have in the formal proof.
This allows us to obtain V without solving an integral.
In this case, the buyer value is derived as
Vb = γ (Fh(s
′)δVb + (1− Fh(s′))(1− λ))
+ (1− γ) (Fl(s′)δVb + (1− Fl(s′))(−g))
Vb =
1
1− δ
1− Fl(s′)
2− Fh(s′)− Fl(s′)(1− Fh(s
′))(1− λ)
+
1
1− δ
1− Fh(s′)
2− Fh(s′)− Fl(s′)(1− Fl(s
′))(−g)
=⇒ Vb = (1− Fh(s
′))(1− Fl(s′))
2− Fh(s′)− Fl(s′)
1− λ− g
1− δ .
The cutoff signal can be obtained by solving
(
(1− Fl(s′))fh(s′)
(1− Fh(s′))fl(s′) + (1− Fl(s′))fh(s′) −
δ
1− δ
(1− Fl(s′))(1− Fh(s′))
2− Fh(s′)− Fl(s′)
)
(1− λ) =(
(1− Fh(s′))fl(s′)
(1− Fh(s′))fl(s′) + (1− Fl(s′))fh(s′) −
δ
1− δ
(1− Fl(s′))(1− Fh(s′))
2− Fh(s′)− Fl(s′)
)
(−g)
(12)
and the existence again requires that the necessary condition (10) holds. We can
now use the same distributions for shared signal as previously
fh(s) = 2s for all s ∈ [0, 1] and fl(s) = 2− 2s for all s ∈ [0, 1] ,
such that
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Fh(s) = s
2 for all s ∈ [0, 1] and Fl(s) = s− s2 for all s ∈ [0, 1] ,
to find numerically that an equilibrium like this exists for a range of parameter
values depicted in Figure 2b where 2a gives the related cutoff.
For instance the following parameter values would be consistent with inverse
dynamics:
g = 0.1, δ = 0.3, λ = 0.2 and g = 0.1, δ = 0.65, λ = 0.75.
It is also easy for anybody to check from above that, if we set the gap to zero
g = 0 to facilitate the calculation, then s′ = 0.5 solves (12) for δ ≈ 0.55. Cond. (10)
will then be satisfied for low enough values of λ ≤ 0.15.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: The value of the cutoff signal that satisfies Eq. (12) for (λ, δ) ∈ (0, 1)2
and g = 0.1 (a) and an indicator of whether Cond. (10) is holding for (λ, δ) ∈ (0, 1)2
and g = 0.1 (b).
Corollary 4 Inverse dynamics could arise in a better market.
6 Closing remarks
Though a useful abstraction in economics, information on common transaction val-
ues remains rarely purely private all the way up to the moment when the terms of
trade are negotiated by a buyer and a seller. In particular, when trading partners
meet face-to-face, some payoff related information is often transmitted under both
traders’ eyes.
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We provide an example of a market in which this opportunity to get additional
information in the bilateral meetings, through which trading is conducted, causes
a reduction in liquidity in a setup where the static Walrasian market may not fail.
Indeed, all goods could be traded efficiently in the first match if the shared signals
were removed.
This dismal outcome arises here because the possibility to wait for higher signals,
which give rise to better prices, makes either the buyers or the high quality sellers
too picky to trade for the lowest signals. The effect works through an increase in the
outside options; it does not depend, for example, whether we have a signaling game
or a screening game. Hence, we obtain a classic trade-off between rent extraction
and efficiency.
Based on these findings, we think it might be appropriate to reconsider what is
meant by a lemons market. While in a static market, only the case where average
quality is low is bound to fail, in a dynamic setting with some information percola-
tion in bilateral meetings or otherwise, the market is inefficient independent of the
average quality. In absence of reliable evidence, buyers and sellers may for instance
have an incentive to pay excessive attention to rumors or to coordinate their actions
based on only mildly relevant signals. According to our welfare results, this can
then reduce market liquidity.
We also study what kinds of dynamics can be sustained when average quality in
the market and outside options arise endogenously in a stationary Markovian equi-
librium. We are particularly keen to find out whether inverse trading dynamics that
have been largely ignored by the literature are possible with our rich communication
opportunities. We show that high quality can be traded faster than low quality in a
better market but not in the lemons market. We argue that both cases are relevant
because neither market is efficient due to the additional coordinating information
and the option to delay trade.
Our rudimentary, extended analysis reveals further that from an efficiency per-
spective it might be better to stick with standard dynamics. Notwithstanding, we
hypothesize that subsidizing low quality sellers or otherwise increasing their outside
options, say through some of the contemplated market interventions to steer clear
from market illiquidity, can engender the prevalence of less efficient inverse dynamics
– which seems to be a common trading pattern in markets for skilled labor. We think
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that this relation between dynamics and welfare merits a closer investigation.33
Appendix
INTUITIVE CRITERION (Cho and Kreps, 1987)
Definition 7 Consider an equilibrium belief system pi. Denote by Θ(p′) ⊂ {h, l} the
subset of sellers who prefer the disequilibrium price offer p′ to the equilibrium price offer p
when considered high quality sellers. The equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion if there
is a seller type θ′ ∈ Θ(p′) who prefers p′ to p for whatever the buyers’ belief, as long as
the buyer takes him for a seller type θ ∈ Θ(p′).
In our case the belief system fails the Intuitive Criterion if (a) pi(p′) = Eγ(u|p′) > ul
but the high quality seller would always lose by the deviation to p′ whereas the low quality
seller would gain from it even if his type was known or (b) pi(p′) = Eγ(u|p′) < uh but the
low quality seller would always lose by the deviation to p′ whereas the high quality seller
would gain from it even if his type was known.
PROOFS OF REMARKS 2 AND 3
Note first that, due to the discounting, it is better to trade at once than wait for the
repetition of this same stationary equilibrium. In Lemma 2, the seller is willing to offer
p provided that any higher price offer is rejected because of the low off path beliefs that
would arise. In Lemma 3, such adverse beliefs present no threat as the matched buyer and
seller both know the quality and sellers can therefore use ph = uh and pl = ul to extract
full surplus. Since buyer value is here zero, buyers have no reason to reject these offers. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Pooling meeting-specific PBE
As both sellers make the same price offer p for the associated signal realization, s, its
use prompts no updating of buyers’ beliefs: Eγ(u|s, p) = Eγ(u|s); these are given by Eq.
(4). Consequently, to make the buyers accept a pooling price offer p(s), it is necessary
that p ≤ Eγ(u|s)− δVb and, to make both types of sellers offer that price, it is necessary
that p ≥ maxθ=l,h {cθ + δVθ}. In other words, for a pooling meeting-specific PBE exist,
the expected utility to buyer Eγ(u|s) must be high enough to compensate the traders from
the loss of their continuation values and costs cθ + δVθ + δVb for θ = l, h. Otherwise, any
price offer would do as profitable deviations (i) to higher prices or (ii) to lower prices (in
hope to increase the acceptance probability σ?b (p, s) if it is below unity), can be prevented
by attributing such deviations to low quality sellers (see Footnote 28 for some additional
discussion about this topic). By Cond. (7), if p < Eγ(u|s)− δVb, the buyers should accept
33That analysis should account for both the surplus accrued during the convergence path and
the steady state welfare: transition to a steady state with inverse dynamics may generate more
surplus than a transition to a steady state with standard dynamics, depending on relative gains
from trade λ and the gap g.
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the pooling price with probability one but, if p = Eγ(u|s)−δVb, they could also randomize
between accepting and rejecting the pooling price. 
Separating meeting-specific PBE
As different sellers use different prices in a separating equilibrium, pl for the low and
ph for the high, buyers’ beliefs become degenerate after the price offer has been made:
Eγ(u|s, pl) = ul < Eγ(u|s) and Eγ(u|s, ph) = uh > Eγ(u|s). Thus, to make both parties
willing to trade for these prices, according to Cond. (6) and Cond. (9), it must hold that
pl ∈ [cl + δVl, ul − δVb] and ph ∈ [ch + δVh, uh − δVb]. To keep the low quality sellers from
mimicking the high quality sellers, it should also hold that
σ?b (pl, s)(pl − cl) + (1− σ?b (pl, s))) δVl ≥ σ?b (ph, s)(ph − cl) + (1− σ?b (ph, s)) δVl.
Note that, since pl < ph, the low price must be accepted more frequently than the high
price, σ?b (pl, s) > σ
?
b (ph, s), to satisfy the incentive condition for the low quality sellers.
(Obviously, the high quality sellers have no incentive to mimic the low quality sellers as
the low price pl is below the high cost ch.) Therefore, to make the buyers randomize
between accepting and rejecting the high price ph, it is necessary that this price keeps the
buyers at their continuation values, ph = Eγ(u|ph, s)− δVb.
Moreover, also the low price pl must keep the buyers at their continuation values, pl =
Eγ(u|pl, s)− δVb, and it must additionally be accepted with probability one, σ?b (pl, s) = 1.
To see why this is so observe that, if the former requirement pl = Eγ(u|pl, s)− δVb would
not hold, there would be a profitable deviation for the seller from pl to pl + η to keep
the acceptance rate the same but to increase the price offer and, if the latter requirement
σ?b (pl, s) = 1 would not hold, there would be a profitable deviation for the seller from pl
to pl − η to make the buyer accept the price for certain, for some tiny η > 0. As buyers’
beliefs are already the harshest possible for pl it is impossible to discipline such deviations
by out of equilibrium path beliefs, which could not be worse still.
It is clear from above that a separating equilibrium cannot exist unless cl+δVl ≤ ul−δVb
and ch + δVh ≤ uh − δVb. Given the usual freedom with off path beliefs, these necessary
conditions for existence are also sufficient. 
Semi-pooling meeting-specific PBE
We first show that both sellers cannot randomize their prices simultaneously:
To the contrary, suppose the sellers mix between two pooling prices, p1 and p2 such
that a1 := σ?b (p
1, s) and a2 := σ?b (p
2, s). With no loss of generality, we now can assume
that p1 < p2 such that a1 > a2. By individual rationality, the prices should be such that
pi − cθ ≥ δVθ if price pi is to be used by sellers of quality θ = h, l. Now, to keep the high
quality sellers mixing between p1 and p2, it should hold that
a1
(
p1 − ch
)
+
(
1− a1) δVh = a2 (p2 − ch)+ (1− a2) δVh
a1p1 =
(
a1 − a2) (ch + δVh) + a2p2
and, to keep the low quality sellers mixing between p1 and p2, it must hold that
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a1
(
p1 − cl
)
+
(
1− a1) δVl = a2 (p2 − cl)+ (1− a2) δVl
a1p1 =
(
a1 − a2) (cl + δVl) + a2p2.
Clearly, both of them cannot be satisfied at the same time unless ch + δVh = cl + δVl.
Instead, for the most natural case of δVh + λ > δVl, if the high quality mixes between p
1
and p2, then the low quality prefers to use p1 only and, if the low quality mixes between
p1 and p2, then the high quality prefers to use p2 only. In the former (latter) case, p2 is a
separating (pooling) price and p1 is a pooling (separating) price.
We then derive conditions for existence and give ideas about characterization:
Note that separating prices are perfectly revealing such that Eγ(u|pl, s) = ul and
Eγ(u|ph, s) = uh for any s. This implies that pl ∈ [cl, ul] and ph ∈ [ch, uh] for the sellers
to offer them and for the buyers to accept them. As mentioned two cases could arise:
(i) If the higher price p2 is the pooling price so that low quality sellers partially separate
from the high, then Eγ(u|p2, s) = Eγ(u|s) + ν for some positive ν. (ii) If the lower price
p1 is the pooling price so that high quality sellers partially separate from the low, then
Eγ(u|p1, s) = Eγ(u|s)− ν for some positive ν. Similarly as in Eq. (4), the buyers’ beliefs
are given by Bayes’ rule
Eγ(u|p2, s) := mhfh(s)
mhfh(s) + r2mlfl(s)
uh +
r2mlfl(s)
mhfh(s) + r2mlfl(s)
ul,
Eγ(u|p1, s) := r
1mhfh(s)
r1mhfh(s) +mlfl(s)
uh +
mlfl(s)
r1mhfh(s) +mlfl(s)
ul,
where r2 is the probability of pooling for low quality sellers in case (i) and r1 is the
probability of pooling for high quality sellers in case (ii). A pooling price pi has to lie
within
[
cθ + δVθ, Eγ(u|pi, s)− δVb
]
for θ = l, h and for i = 1, 2. Note that, the first type
(i) of semi-pooling equilibrium exists if
ul ≥ cl + δVl + δVb
uh > ch + δVh + δVb.
The first condition is needed to induce low quality sellers to separate and the second one
to make pooling possible for some mixing rate r1 > 0. The second type (ii) of semi-pooling
equilibrium exists if
Eγ(u|s) > ch + δVh + δVb
Eγ(u|s) > cl + δVl + δVb.
The first condition is necessary to make sure that high quality sellers are willing to pool
(and thus also separate) and the second one guarantees that also for low quality sellers for
some mixing rate r2 > 0.
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We can show that the separating prices are unique for both low quality sellers and
high quality sellers by the same logic as for the separating equilibrium: Case (i): p2 =
E(u|p2, s) − δVb and σ?b (p2, s) < 1 (to keep the buyers mixing and to prevent the low
quality sellers from mimicking the high quality sellers) and pl = ul− δVb (otherwise, there
is a profitable deviation to pl +  for a higher price) and σ
?
b (pl, s) = 1 (otherwise, there is
a profitable deviation to pl −  for a higher acceptance rate). Case (ii): ph = ul − δVb and
σ?b (ph, s) < 1 with (1− σ?b (p1, s))(E(u|p1, s)− p1 − δVb) = 0 (if p1 is not accepted for sure
is must not leave the buyer any surplus; if it however does so, if should be accepted for
certain). The constraints on acceptance probabilities a1 := σ?b (p
1, s) and a2 := σ?b (p
2, s)
we already derived above. 
PROOF OF REMARK 4
Cases 1 and 2: These cases are obvious because neither seller is harmed by a higher
price or a higher acceptance probability and, at least, one of the sellers benefits from them
strictly.
Case 3: As we are looking for a seller maximal equilibrium, to simplify the notation, it
is without loss to assume that Vb = 0. Otherwise, we just have to subtract Vb from each
price p.
Semi-pooling equilibrium of type (i): Suppose that both sellers use a pooling price p and
the low quality sellers mix between the pooling price p and a separating price pl. The
maximal pooling price Eγ(u|s, p) ∈ [Eγ(u|s), uh] clearly depends on the ratio r2 in which
the low quality sellers mix. To keep the low quality sellers indifferent between offering the
pooling price and the separating price, as pl = ul and σ
?
b (pl) = 1, in the best case the
acceptance probability of the higher price offer p must be equal to σ?b (p, s) =
ul−cl−δVl
p−cl−δVl .
Observe that, for any suitable γ, V, and s there can exist many such equilibria with
different r2 and p. As low quality sellers are mixing between pl and p, what they get is
constant over all such equilibria. However, as high quality sellers are pooling to p, what
they expect to obtain equals
Vh(s) =
ul − δVl
p− δVl (p− ch − δVh) + δVh.
This is either maximized by the highest feasible price p = uh (r
2 = 0) if p−ch−δVhp−cl−δVl < 1, or
by the lowest feasible price p = Eγ(u|s) (r2 = 1) if p−ch−δVhp−cl−δVl > 1. That is, any semi pooling
equilibrium of this type would be defeated either by the best separating equilibrium or by
the best pooling equilibrium.
Semi-pooling equilibrium of type (ii): Suppose that both sellers use a pooling price p
and the high quality sellers mix between the pooling price p and a separating price ph.
The maximal pooling price Eγ(u|s, p) ∈ [ch, Eγ(u|s)] clearly depends on the ratio r1 in
which the high quality sellers mix. To keep the high quality sellers indifferent between
offering the pooling price and the separating price, the acceptance probability of the
higher price offer ph must be equal to σ
?
b (ph, s) (uh − ch − δVh) = σ?b (p, s) (p− ch − δVh).
Observe also that, if σ?b (ph, s) (uh − ch − δVh) = σ?b (p, s) (p− ch − δVh) is satisfied, then
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σ?b (ph, s) (uh − cl − δVl) ≤ σ?b (p, s) (p− cl − δVl) is satisfied, such that the low quality seller
have no incentive to mimic the high quality sellers as long as ch + δVh > cl + δVl (we leave
the other case for the reader to think about).
Note again that, for any suitable γ, V, and s, there could exist many such equilibria
with different r1 and p. As high quality sellers are mixing between pl and p and low quality
sellers are pooling to p, what they expect to obtain equals
Vl(s) = σ
?
b (p, s) (p− cl) + (1− σ?b (p, s)) δVl,
Vh(s) = σ
?
b (p, s) (p− ch) + (1− σ?b (p, s)) δVh.
Both of them are maximized by the highest feasible price p = Eγ(u|s) (r1 = 1) and the
highest feasible acceptance probability σ?b (p, s) = 1. That is, any semi-pooling equilibrium
of this type would be defeated by the best pooling equilibrium.
As semi-pooling equilibria are either as of type (i) or of type (ii), any semi-pooling
equilibrium is defeated by either the best pooling equilibrium or by the best separating
equlibrium, or the sellers’ individual rationality constraints bind.
Cases 4 and 5: As p(s) := Eγ(u|s) > pl, the low quality sellers are always better
off if they they play the best pooling equilibrium than if they play the best separating
equilibrium. This is not always the case for the high quality sellers, however. To see this,
denote by sh ∈ (0, 1) the (higher) signal that solves
p(s)− ch = σ?b (ph, s) (ph − ch) + (1− σ?b (ph, s)) δVh where σ?b (ph, s) =
ul − cl − δVl
uh − cl − δVl
and by sl ∈ (0, 1) the (lower) signal that solves p(s)− ch = δVh. Since p(s) := Eγ(u|s) is
larger for larger signals s, for any s ∈ [sh, 1], the high quality sellers are better off if they
they play the best pooling equilibrium than if they play the best separating equilibrium,
whereas for signals s ∈ (sl, sh), it is the opposite.
Notice also that by Proposition 1, individual rationality constraints will always bind for
sufficiently low signal values. If p(s)− ch < δVh, pooling is not feasible and, pl < cl + δVl,
separation is impossible. In the former case the high quality sellers would rather quit than
pool, in the latter case the low quality sellers would rather quit than separate. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
For simplicity of exposition, we consider a better market where g = 0. It is immediate to
extend the analysis to better markets where 1− λ > g > 0.
We study cases where, for signals above a cutoff s′, both sellers make as high a pooling
price offer as is feasible
p(s, s′) :=
1
1 + 1−Fh(s
′)
1−Fl(s′)
fl(s′)
fh(s′)
uh −
1−Fh(s′)
1−Fl(s′)
fl(s
′)
fh(s′)
1 + 1−Fh(s
′)
1−Fl(s′)
fl(s′)
fh(s′)
ul for s ≥ s′ ∈ (0, 1),
and obtain p(s, s′)−cθ whereas, for signals below the cutoff s′, they quit and hence receive
their outside options δVθ.
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Note that while we do not initially pay attention to the fact that the sellers may not
have no incentive to do so but, ultimately, we are interested to find a pair (λ, s′(λ)) of ex-
ogenous λ and endogenous s′ for which this would constitute a seller maximal equilibrium:
(i) IR-h should be satisfied as an equality for a pooling price offer p(s) at s′
p(s′, s′)− ch = δVh =
δ
∫ 1
s′ (p(s
′, s)− ch) dFh(s)
1− δFh(s′)
⇐⇒
p(s′, s′)− λ = δVh =
δ
∫ 1
s′ (p(s
′, s)− λ) dFh(s)
1− δFh(s′) (13)
and (ii) IR-l should not be satisfied for the low separating price offer pl at s
′
ul − cl < δVl =
δ
∫ 1
s′ (p(s
′, s)− cl) dFl(s)
1− δFl(s′) ⇐⇒ λ <
δVl = δ
∫ 1
s′ (p(s
′, s)) dFl(s)
1− δFh(s′) . (14)
For later use, note that (13) can also be rewritten as
p(s′, s′)− 1− δ
1− δFh(s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=M(s′)>1
λ =
δ
∫ 1
s′ p(s
′, s)dFh(s)
1− δFh(s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:δWl(s′)
.
This is applied to show the monotonicity of s and s.
We also need to define a new mapping
g5(s′) := p(s′, s′)− λ− δVh(s′).
for auxiliary purposes. Note that, g5 is continuous in s′ for the intermediate range of
signal values s′ ∈ (0, 1). In addition, by what we have assumed for Proposition 3, its limit
is positive for s′ → 1
g5(s′)→ a− δ Vh(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
and negative as s′ → 0
g5(s′)→ −λ− δ Vh(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
This entails that for any λ ∈ [0, λ] there always exists a fixed point signal, denoted by
s′(λ) ∈ (0, 1), such that (13) holds.
Observe next that although we present no proof to show that the fixed point is unique,
it appears safe to assume that g5 does not have more than a finite number of roots which
satisfy (13). A maximal root and a minimal root therefore exist. They are denoted by
s(λ) and s(λ), respectively. We next show that both s(λ) ∈ (0, 1) and s(λ) ∈ (0, 1) are
increasing in λ. This can be seen from the following
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g5(s(λ), λ) = p(s(λ)), s(λ))−M(s(λ))λ− δWh(s(λ)) = 0
=⇒g5(s(λ), λ+ ε) = p(s(λ), s(λ))−M(s(λ))(λ+ ε)− δWh(s(λ)) < 0, (15)
and
g5(s(λ), λ) = p(s(λ), s(λ))−M(s(λ))λ− δWh(s(λ)) = 0
=⇒g5(s(λ), λ− ε) = p(s(λ), s(λ))−M(s(λ))(λ− ε)− δWh(s(λ)) > 0. (16)
It is also apparent from (15) that, as g5(1, λ + ε) > 0, the largest root for λ + ε must lie
between s(λ) and 1,
s(λ) < s(λ+ ε),
Likewise, (16) makes it clear that, as g5(0, λ− ε) < 0, the smallest root for λ− ε must lie
between 0 and s(λ),
s(λ) > s(λ− ε).
Altogether this implies that all those pairs (λ, s′) that we take an interest in lie in[
0, λ
]× [s(0), s(λ)].
As the next step, we define two sets for each arbitrary λ ∈ (0, 1) where the first set is
included in the second one
S(λ) =
{
(λ, s′)|λ ∈ [0, λ] , s′ = s′(λ)} ⊂ S(λ) = {(λ, s′)|(λ, s′) ∈ [0, λ]× [s(0), s(λ)]} .
For the two related minimization problems, the value of the latter is thereby bounded by
the value of the former as
min
(λ,s′)∈S(λ)
Vl(λ, s
′) ≥ min
(λ,s′)∈S(λ)
Vl(λ, s
′) =: V l.
As the last step, we then note that the value V l is well-defined as the function Vl is
continuous in (λ, s′) and the set S(λ) is compact. The value V l is also positive as Vl(λ, s′)
is positive for any pair (λ, s′) ∈ S(λ). As a result, we have a positive minimum for low
quality seller values in this equilibrium type; in particular, the low quality seller values do
not get smaller and smaller as λ does. This permits us to conclude that both (13) and
(14) are satisfied for λ < δV l. 
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